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This paper examines the managerial incentives in some large Indian private sector firms for the years 1990-91 and 1993-94. The aim is two -fold: One is to analyse how the structure of managerial remuneration has changed after the July 1991 liberalization of remuneration guidelines. A second objective is to see whether there is any evidence of abnormal i ncreases in private sector remuneration after the 1991 liberalization. It is found that remuneration in real terms has increased at the upper levels of managerial hierarchy but fallen at the lower levels. However, intra-level variation in remuneration has increased at all levels of managerial hierarchy.
Subrata Sarkar and Anindya Sen are members of the faculty at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.
Managerial remuneration in India, till recently, was subject to detailed regulations. The Indian government, motivated by socialistic objectives, had imposed a ceiling of Rs 15,000 per month on directorial remuneration of firms with a capital base of Rs 15 crore or more under the schedule XIII of the Companies Act. Moreover, while directors could be paid a share of the net profits, such payments were subject to a limit of 50 per cent of their annual salaries. Expenditure on perquisites like housing, car, etc. was also limited to Rs 1.35 lakh per annum. Private sector industries were complaining that these regulations posed a major obstacle to the designing of efficient remuneration structures.
In July 1991, the Government of India finally took note of these complaints and liberalized the regulations governing managerial pay. The monthly cap of Rs 15,000 was increased to Rs 50,000. Against the earlier limit of 50 per cent of the annual salary, directors could now be paid commissions of up to 1 per cent of net profits without any upper limit. Perquisites like housing, car, etc. could now be allowed up to Rs 4.5 lakh.
As the private sector began the process of restructuring managerial remunerations in the new, liberalized regime, there was a widespread perception that private sector pay was increasing by leaps and bounds and that the differential between private sector and public sector remuneration was widening significantly. The public sector cited the remuneration levels in the private sector to demand, and eventually get, significant increases from the Fifth Pay Commission. This paper examines the behaviour of managerial remuneration in some large Indian private sector firms for the years 1990-91 and 1993-94. The aim is twofold: One is to see whether there is any evidence of abnormal increases in private sector remuneration after the July 1991 liberalization. A second objective is to analyse the structure of remuneration at the various managerial levels. We employ both tabular analysis and regression analysis to examine these issues.
Issues
In the context of internal labour markets, what can we say about the possible impact of the liberalized guidelines on managerial remuneration?
• Before liberalization, the guidelines placed artifi cial, binding restrictions on the gross salaries payable at the highest levels of managerial hier archy. Therefore, after the relaxation of guidelines, we expect to see a rather sharp increase in remu nerations at this level.
• The effect on the lower levels of managerial hierarchy is less clear. If a tournament-like structure of incentives is effective, then salary differentials should increase in all managerial levels. 1 This is because the binding cap on the highest level would imply that (a) to maintain parity between different levels, the salary differentials could not have been large and (b) within each level, there would be less scope for differentials, so that the coefficient-ofvariation in salary would be lower in each level. After liberalization, we, therefore, expect to see widening salary differentials across levels as well as within levels. This would be particularly true of internal markets where salaries are determined more by bargaining and internal norms than by market forces.
Existing Literature
There is a burgeoning literature on executive compensation. Many papers have tried to:
• calculate the lifetime earnings of CEOs taking adequately into account various elements of the incentive packages, particularly stock options • compare this with the gross compensation enjoyed by vice-presidents
• compare the remunerations of American CEOs with their European and Japanese counterparts
• regress earnings on seniority, experience, qualifi cations, company performance, etc. to identify the relative importance of the factors that determine managerial compensation.
Much of this work is very aggregative in nature and focuses only on the highest hierarchical levels. For example, Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1993) carry out an empirical investigation of executive compensation using over 200 firms and over 2000 executives per year over a five-year period. The study analyses the pay of CEOs and senior vice-presidents, the focus being on the pay differentials between these two levels across all firms. The pay differentials are controlled for differences in education, work experience, and firm tenure between these two levels. In the Indian context, Pani and Shanker (1982) , analysed the salary structure for employees of 1650 firms for the year 1975-76. They too were interested in aggregative characteristics for this group of employees rather than in the managerial hierarchies within firms.
In contrast, our paper focuses on middle and lower level managers as well as those at the top-most level. This enables us to analyse in some detail the structure of managerial remuneration. Moreover, we compare data for two years -1990-91 and 1993-94 -to analyse how the compensation structures have changed after liberalization of managerial pay.
Data Source
The primary data source for the analysis is the Annual Report of the respective companies. According to Section 217 (2a) of the Companies Act, 1956 and Companies (Particulars of Employees) Rules, 1975, Indian firms are required to provide information about their employees earning income above a specified limit. The particulars are generally provided as a separate annexure to the Directors' Report. They include information on (i) name, (ii) age, (ii) qualification, (iv) total experience, (v) date of commencement of employment with the firm, (vi) designation and nature of duties, and (vii) gross 2 and net remuneration received.
The empirical analysis is based on data for the accounting years 1990-91 and 1993-94. The minimum specified limit in these years was Rs 144,000 per annum. Our sample, therefore, includes all employees who earned income above this specified limit in 1990-91.
3 Seven companies are included in our analysis. The focus of the analysis is on managers and the hierarchy of managers. Therefore, we first scrutinized the particulars of each employee for these seven firms, especially the information on designation and nature of duties, and identified all those personnel who had the word "manager" in their designations and all those who belonged to the management team within a firm, eg., vice-presidents, management committee members, etc. Essentially, we included the "line" managers and dropped all "staff" personnel. Next, we classified the selected "managers" into appropriate hierarchical levels. For this, we carefully went through the designation descriptions appearing in all the companies, and then classified these designations into five common hierarchical levels. Level 1 was classified as the highest and level 5 the lowest hierarchical level. The description of each level and the list of designations for each level is given in Appendix I.
An alternative way of classifying managers into different hierarchial levels would be to consider their job responsibilities. It may be argued that such a classification may make hierarchial levels more comparable across companies. However, executing this procedure requires detailed data on job responsibilities for each level and for each company. Such data do not exist and have to be gathered only through primary surveys. Moreover, even if such data were available, the data would be necessarily qualitative in nature so that any classification of levels based on this information will have to be necessarily subjective. Our classification of levels based on designation is objective in nature and internalizes the varying job responsibilities across levels. Also, since our regression equations include company specific dummies, levelspecific differences in job responsibilities across companies would be captured by these dummies, albeit imperfectly.
Sample Finns
Our sample consists of seven firms. They are: (1 These seven firms are among the leading private sector firms in terms of sales. Their range of products is diverse and includes steel, machinery, cement, textiles, chemicals, and toilet products. They include some very old as well as new firms. Their plants are located all over India and there are considerable differences among them in terms of their geographical dispersion (Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 2). This group of firms is, therefore, fairly representative of the established manufacturing sector of the Indian industry. Table 1 shows that, across all firms, the number of managers in our sample increased more than 3.5 fold between the years 1990-91 and 1993-94. In 1993-94, the number of managers at the lowest level increased significantly, and accounted for 80 per cent of the total number of managers in our sample. Table 2 gives the mean and standard deviations of (i) age, (ii) in-firm experience (te nure), (iii) out-offirm experience, (iv) total work experience, and (v) gross salary of managers for all the seven firms. There was a noticeable decline in the mean age of managers in 1993-94, which in turn was reflected in the mean total, rather than in the mean in-firm experience figures, ie., mean number of years spent in current employment. Thus, compared to 1990-91, the average manager in 1993-94 was younger, but had been associated with the same firm for almost an identical number of years. Across all the firms, this would seem to indicate that most of the new managers were inducted into managerial ranks from within the firm, rather than from outside. The mean gross salary declined between these two years. However, this table obviously conceals any inter-firm or inter-level differences. Table 3 allows us to look at inter-level differences. It shows that in both the years, the mean salary increased monotonically as one moved from the lowest (level 5) to the highest (level 1) levels in the managerial hierarchy. However, the mean salary in 1993-94 showed an increase in real terms over the 1990-91 figures only in levels 1 and 3. This was accompanied by a significant increase in the coefficient of variation at all levels, indicating that, in 1993-94, salaries were much more dispersed. Moreover, in both the years, the coefficients of variation increased between level 4 and level 1, indicating that there was greater variation in salaries at higher levels of the managerial hierarchy. However, the coefficient of variation fell between levels 5 and 4. Since level 5 is probably the "port of entry" into managerial hierarchy, one can expect to find managers with very diverse backgrounds at this level. Moreover, this level is also used as an important screen to filter out managers suitable for promotion to the higher levels of hierarchy. One can, therefore, find managers at this level who have been with the firm for a long period of time and are earning high salaries but have little prospect for further promotion to coexist with the young and upwardly mobile group, who are earning much less.
Tabular Analysis
If there are significant differences in salaries between the two groups, this might explain why the coefficient of variation is higher in level 5 compared to level 4.
One can also note the very high coefficient of variation at level 1. This level consists of family members, board members, owners as well as chief executive officers. Given this wide mix, it is not surprising that this has the greatest variation. Table 4 provides the percentage increases in mean salaries between levels. In 1990-91, the differentials between salary levels widened progressively as one moved up the hierarchy, except at the top level. The relatively low gap between level 2 and level 1 in 1990-91 can most likely be attributed to the artificial caps placed by the government on top level salaries. However, after the liberalization of the remuneration guidelines, there was a marked widening of the differential between level 2 and level 1. There was also a significant widening of differentials at the lower levels. The only exception seems to have occurred at level 2, where salaries did not increase comparably thereby leading to a fall in differential between level 2 and level 3. A closer inspection of the data reveals After liberalization, there is, therefore, a greater evidence of a tournament-like structure in moving from level 2 to 1. The salary differentials between levels 5 and 3 have also widened.
Though the tabular analysis provides some preliminary, but revealing trends, it does not control for firm-specific factors or individual-specific factors like, age, experience, academic qualifications, etc., that can influence managerial earnings. As our data show, there are significant differences in the human capital characteristics of managers in the various levels of managerial hierarchy. Also, as Table 2 suggests, there are some observable changes in the characteristics of managers over the two years of our analysis.
Regression Analysis
The regression analysis examines the nature and extent of change in managerial remuneration across different hierarchial levels between 1990-91 and 1993-94 after controlling for firm-specific and individual -specific factors. The analysis is done by estimating simple analysis of covariance models incorporating both qualitative factors (level dummies, company dummies, and a time dummy) as well as quantitative factors (age and total experience) to analyse the changes in managerial remuneration. We start with the simple model = « where R is the remuneration of manager where, L. is a level dummy variable which equals 1 if manager i is in level j, and 0 otherwise; C ki is a company dummy variable which equals 1 if manager i is in company k, and 0 otherwise; T. is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the remuneration figure is for the year 1993-94, and 0 otherwise; and X. is the vector of quantitative factors which influence managerial remuneration. Three variables are subsumed in X namely, age, experience, and experience squared. Results for the linear specification as well as the log specification are reported in Tables 5 and 6. Table  5 reports the regression results without companyspecific effects. The results from the linear model indicate that average managerial remuneration increases progressively as one moves up from the lowest to the highest level, a result that we found in terms of the simple tabular analysis. Estimates from the semilog model indicate that, compared to level 5, average managerial remuneration is 18 per cent (from the semilog model, exp(.1689)-l = .18) higher in level 4, 44 per cent higher in level 3, 61 per cent higher in level 2, and 118 per cent higher in level 1. Both models indicate that there are positive returns to experience, but the rate of return declines as experience increases. The age variable is not significant. More importantly, the coefficient on the time dummy is negative and highly significant, suggesting that average managerial remuneration has fallen in period 1 in real terms. The average percentage fall is estimated at 12 per cent (from the semi-log model, exp(-0.129)-l=.12 ). Table 6 reports the regression results with company-specific effects and highlights some important points. First, there are significant company-specific differences. Four out of the six company dummies are significant. In particular, the differential in average salary between the lowest paying company (company 1-Century Textiles and Industries Ltd.) and the highest paying company (company 5 -Hindustan Lever) is quite large. Second, the level-specific effects found in the model without company-specific effects are preserved, both in terms of their magnitude as well as their significance, even when company-specific effects are introduced into the model. This is true for both the linear and well as the semi-log model. Thus, level differentials are quite robust to alternative specifications. Third, the coefficient on the time dummy is still negative and significant, indicating that even if we control for company specific differentials, average managerial remuneration has fallen in the post-liberalization year. However, the time effect is substantially reduced, cut to almost half in the linear model, and to one third in the log specification model. Finally, the experience effect is much more pronounced now, and there is a significant age effect. While the preceding model enables us to study the time effect on average managerial remuneration, this model does not help us to examine the important question of whether this time effect varies across the different managerial levels. To do so, we have to interact the time and level dummies and include these interaction terms into the regression. Specifically, the regression equation should now be specified as:
In this specification, y measures the time effect for level 5, while (j+λ), (y+λ,,), (y+λ, 3 ), and (y+λ 4 ), measure the time effects for levels 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Regression results for both linear and semi-log specifications are reported in Table 7 .
The results clearly bring out the differential effect of time across levels. Results from the linear model indicate that average managerial remuneration has fallen in the lower levels (levels 5 and 4), but has increased in the higher levels (level 3, 2, and 1). Results from the semi-log model also support these trends except for level 2. The increase is most significant in level 1. The time differential for levels 2 and 3 are much lower. As a result, the difference in managerial remuneration across the levels has increased significantly in 1993-94 compared to 1990-91. For example, the difference in managerial remuneration between level 1 and level 5 has increased to 160 per cent (from the semi-log specification, exp (.6107 +.3421) -1 = 1.6) in 1993-94, compared to 84 per cent (from the semilog specification, exp (.6107) = 0.84) in 1990-91. The regression results thus indicate that subsequent to liberalization of managerial pay, remuneration has increased only at the higher levels. As expected, the increase is most significant at the highest level. At lower levels, remuneration has actually fallen in real terms. As a result, the differentials across levels have increased over time.
It can be argued that in the post-liberalization era, higher remuneration in the private sector is likely to be targeted, and given to only new recruits rather than to every employee across the board. In order to address this question, we looked at the comparative salary paid in 1993-94 to employees who had joined the company recently, and to employees who have been in the company for some time.
Specifically, we divided the employees who were in the 1993-94 sample into two groups. The first group consisted of employees who have joined the company in the last two years, ie., employees with tenure of less than or equal to two years, and the second group consisted of employees with tenure greater than two years. We denoted the first group of employees as "new recruits," and the second group of employees as the "old recruits." 9 We then looked at the comparative salaries of the old recruits and the new recruits in the year 1993-94, after controlling for differences in age, experience, and company-specific effects. The regression equation estimated is of the form:
where N. is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the employee is a new recruit, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient X. denotes the deviation of salary of a new recruit in level j from the salary of an old recruit in the same level. Regression results are presented in Table 8 . Except for level 1, all interaction variables are highly insignificant. This indicates that apart from level 1, the average salary paid in 1993-94 to a new recruit was not any different from that paid to an old recruit. Some other points also emerge from our analysis. First, most of the new recruits were persons who were working in other companies prior to joining the current one. Secondly, most of the new recruits were at level 5. Thirdly, compared to 1990-91, salary in level 5 has fallen in 1993-94 in real terms. These observations coupled with the fact that the 1993-94 salary of a new recruit was not different from an old recruit suggest that firms have been able to attract new employees without increasing average remuneration levels.
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that substantial increase in private sector remuneration, following liberalization, has occurred only at higher levels. At lower levels, real wages have fallen. Since lower level managers account for nearly 80 per cent of total managerial employees, the average managerial pay (taking all levels together) has actually fallen in real terms. There is also no evidence that new recruits are paid higher salary. Also, as hypothesized, remuneration differentials have increased substantially both across and within levels after relaxation of the guidelines. It seems that the corporate sector has taken the opportunity to design remuneration structures which are aligned to the responsibilities and duties at different levels of hierarchy. How far these new incentive structures are reflected in improved performance of the corporates is a question we plan to analyse in the future.
Notes
1. Due to the difficulty of measuring actual effort levels, employees are ranked on the basis of relative performance: the winners get promoted, while the losers are passed over. Promotion brings higher pay. This is called a tournament. Tournaments are used primarily because of two reasons: (i) cardinal information about performances is difficult to generate; (ii) when there is a large common element to the uncertainty that affects the relationship between efforts and measured performance, look ing at relative performance can effectively elimi nate the common factors and, therefore, permit better information about who worked hard and who did not. The higher a person rises within the firm, the fewer the opportunities for further pro motion (given a pyramidal structure), which re duces the incentive to seek further promotion. To maintain the incentive to compete for advance ment, the pay differentials should increase as one moves from lower to higher levels.
2. Gross remuneration received includes salary, com mission, bonus, house rent allowance or value of perquisites for accommodation, car perquisite value/allowance, employers' contribution to Provi dent Fund and Superannuation Scheme, leave travel facility, reimbursement of medical expenses, overtime and all other allowances/perquisites and terminal benefits as applicable. In short, gross remuneration is the total payout to the employee in that particular year. Net remuneration represents the amount received after deduction of taxes, Provident Fund, Superannuation Scheme, and other reimbursement.
3. Employees who earned income only for part of the year are not included in our sample.
4. A more appropriate way to define the hierarchical levels is to base the classification on the organi zational chart of each company. We are in the process of obtaining this information. However, we do believe that the relation between designation and the organizational ladder is quite strong and, Vol. 24, No. 2, April -]une 1999 therefore, our current classification is not without merit.
5. The numbers in parentheses are the same as those which are employed to denote the respective firms in the later sections of this paper.
6. The All-India Consumer Price Index for Urban Non-manual Employees, which was 161 in 1990-91 and 249 in 1993-94, has been used to convert the nominal figures for 1993-94 into relative terms.
7. The literature on human capital suggests that earnings, apart from other factors, depend on years of schooling and experience, with rate of earnings declining with increased experience. Ideally, we would have liked to include schooling years di rectly, in the regression. However, the data source repor ts only the educational qualifications of the managers and not the exact years of schooling. The reported educational qualifications are many in number and too diverse to allow easy quantifica tion. The age variable was included in the regres sion to capture differences in earnings that is due to schooling.
The literature also suggest that age, education, and experience are related by the equation "eduAppendix 1: Classification cation = age -experience -6," on the assumption that an individual begins his education at age 6. Thus, any two variables can be incorporated in an earnings regression without introducing high collinearity among the variables. Many studies use age as a proxy for experience, because data on experience are difficult to obtain.
8. Suppose X Q is the average managerial remuneration in level 5, and X 1 is the average managerial remuneration in level 1. Then In X 1 -In X 0 = In (1 + r) where r is the percentage increase in salary in level 1 from level 5. If r is small, In (1+r) is approximately equal to r. In our case, the percent age changes across levels and time are quite high. We, therefore, take exp{a.} -1 rather than a. to be the measure of percentage change.
9. The "new recruits" group in rum includes two types of employees. Employees for whom the current job is the first job ("fresh" recruits), and employees who have worked in some other company, prior to joining the current one. Of the total number of 4160 employees included in the 1993-94 sample, 328 are new recruits. Of these, only 11 are "fresh" recruits. Nearly 80 per cent of the new recruits are at level 5, with an average experience of 16 years. of Designations into Levels
Level-1
President, president and managing director, senior president, executive president, joint president, management committee member, director (board of directors), managing director, managing director and chief executive, joint managing director, director and chief executive, executive director, executive director and general manager, vice chairman and managing director, executive vice chairman and managing director, chairman, chairman and managing director, and chief executive.
Level-2
Vice president, senior vice president, assistant vice president, executive vice president, executive vice chairman, adviser, and chief adviser.
Level-3
Company secretary, director and general manager, joint general manager, senior general manager, general manager, group general manager, additional general manager, director, and joint director.
Level-4
Assistant director, deputy director, senior deputy director, deputy company secretary, deputy general manager, senior deputy general manager, and assistant general manager.
Level-5
Chief manager, assistant chief manager, senior manager, deputy manager, additional manager, additional senior manager, joint manager, manager, regional manager, divisional manager, and assistant manager. Total number of designations: 52. 
